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Most defenders of the new mechanistic approach accept ontic constraints for successful 
scientific explanation (Illari [2013]; Craver [2014]). The minimal claim is that scientific 
explanations have objective truthmakers, namely mechanisms that exist in the physical world 
independently of any observer and that cause or constitute the phenomena-to-be-explained. 
How can this idea be applied to type-level explanations? Many authors at least implicitly 
assume that in order for mechanisms to be the truthmakers of type-level explanation they need 
to be regular (Andersen [2012]; Sheredos [2015]). One problem of this assumption is that 
most mechanisms are (highly) stochastic in the sense that they ‘fail more often than they 
succeed’ (Bogen [2005]; Andersen [2012]). How can a mechanism type whose instances are 
more likely not to produce an instance of a particular phenomenon type be the truthmaker of 
the explanation of that particular phenomenon type? In this paper, I will give an answer to this 
question. I will analyze the notion of regularity and I will discuss Andersen's suggestion for 
how to cope with stochastic mechanisms. I will argue that her suggestion cannot account for 
all kinds of stochastic mechanisms and does not provide an answer as to why regularity 
grounds type-level explanation. According to my analysis, a mechanistic type-level 
explanation is true if and only if at least one of the following two conditions is satisfied: the 
mechanism brings about the phenomenon more often than any other phenomenon 
(‘Comparative Regularity’) or the phenomenon is more often brought about by the 
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According to the new mechanistic approach, mechanisms are crucial for the special sciences 
(especially the life sciences). Most prominently, the new mechanists argue that explanation in 
the special sciences is mechanistic in the sense that phenomena are explained by referring to 
mechanisms that are responsible for them. An example of such an explanation is the 
explanation of neurotransmitter release (MDC [2000]; Craver [2007a]). Roughly, the 
mechanism that explains neurotransmitter release consists of an action potential that reaches 
the axon terminal that causes calcium channels to open, which causes calcium to influx into 
the axon terminal, which in the end causes synaptic vesicles filled with neurotransmitters to 
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fuse with the membrane of the axon terminal, which leads to a release of the neurotransmitters 
into the synaptic cleft. Importantly, in this example, the mechanism is not supposed to explain 
only one particular occurrence of neurotransmitter release. Rather, it is meant to explain how 
neurotransmitter release is brought about in general. In this sense, mechanistic explanations 
are usually type-level explanations (but they need not be).  
Additionally, most new mechanists hold that mechanistic explanation is ontic in some 
sense. They differ in how these ontic norms are spelled out. According to the so-called ‘ontic 
view of scientific explanation’ (Craver [2007a], [2014]), explanations are ‘objective 
portion[s] of the causal structure of the world’ that ‘are not true or false’, ‘they just are’ 
(Craver [2014], p. 40) and do ‘not depend on the existence of intentional agents’ as, for 
example, explanatory models do (Craver [2014], p. 36). Furthermore, ontic explanations 
‘consist in all and only the relevant features of the mechanism in question’ (Craver [2014], p. 
40). Hence, according to the ontic view of scientific explanations, explanations and 
mechanisms are one and the same thing that exists in the external world independently of us. 
The ontic view has been criticized mainly on the grounds that explanation cannot be 
successful without obeying some epistemic norms (Bechtel [2008], p. 18; Wright [2012]; 
Sheredos [2015]). Still, all or at least most new mechanists seem to accept a weakened 
version of the ontic account. According to the weak reading of the ontic view, good scientific 
explanations have to account for ontic norms and epistemic norms (Illari [2013]; Craver 
[2014]). Here, the ontic norms can be interpreted in terms of the truth of an explanation: an 
explanation has to describe the causal structure of the physical world in a correct way to be 
true. In this sense, explanations are descriptions or models of the world and mechanisms are 
their truthmakers. Still, in order to be a good explanation truth might not be sufficient— 
epistemic norms (like, for example, understandability) might have to be satisfied as well.1 In 
this paper, I will presuppose the weak interpretation of the ontic view. Hence, I will take 
explanations to be descriptions or models that are not identical with mechanisms but are made 
true by them (for a discussion of type-level explanation/generalizations in the context of the 
strong reading of the ontic view see Sheredos [2015]). 
Presupposing a weak reading of the ontic view, the new mechanists seem to be committed 
to the view that also in the case of mechanistic type-level explanations the truthmakers are 
mechanisms. How can mechanisms be the truthmakers of type-level explanations like the 
explanation of neurotransmitter release described above? One answer to this question might 
                                                
1 The ‘epistemic view’ of scientific explanation might be interpreted accordingly: its strong reading is that 
scientific explanation has to obey purely epistemic norms—there can be good explanations that are not true; the 
weak reading is identical to the weak reading of the ontic claim. 
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be found in what I will call the ‘regularity-based characterization of mechanisms’. Many 
mechanists assume that mechanisms are regular in some sense (MDC [2000]; Andersen 
[2012]). For example, Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver (MDC [2000]) 
characterize mechanisms as involving ‘regular changes’, and as ‘regular in that they work 
always or for the most part in the same way under the same conditions’ (MDC [2000], p. 3). 
Benjamin Barros argues that ‘[s]ome degree of regularity is necessary to make predictive 
explanations’ ([2008], p. 310). Similarly, Lane DesAutels holds that ‘if we do not require 
mechanisms to be productive of regular or invariant change at all, then [...] mechanisms no 
longer serve to ground prediction and support intervention strategies’ ([2011], p. 921). 
Finally, Holly Andersen ([2012]) agrees that type-level explanation is crucial in the sciences 
and argues that this requires mechanisms to be regular: 
 
Mechanistic explanatory practices in the sciences hinge on considering single instances as 
instances of a type, and on providing explanations based on mechanisms that constitute a type of 
causal chain, not merely a single instance of one. What happens when a single neuron fires once is 
not the target of investigation or of explanation. What happens when neurons fire, and why and 
how it happens, in general: this is what mechanisms can explain, but only if they retain regularity. 
(Andersen [2012], p. 429) 
 
Hence, it could be argued that mechanisms are the truthmakers of type-level explanations 
because mechanisms are regularly occurring types that bring about the phenomenon to be 
explained. Although this view seems to provide a promising route to mechanistic type-level 
explanation, one problem for the regularity-based characterization of mechanisms is, what I 
will call, the ‘Bogen-Argument’ (Bogen [2005]; see also Section 3). Roughly, Jim Bogen 
argues that many mechanisms work rather irregularly. For example, the neurotransmitter 
release mechanism fails more often that it succeeds (I will call mechanisms that are more 
likely to fail than to succeed ‘high failure mechanisms’). To think that this irregularity is only 
due to a lack of knowledge and that we can always establish a full-fledged regularity, 
according to Bogen, is an ‘article of faith’ (Bogen [2005], p. 400).  
The insight that explanatory power does not depend on deterministic generalizations was 
one motivation for philosophers of science to abandon the classical D-N model of scientific 
explanation (Salmon [1989], chapters 3 and 4). For example, according to Wesley Salmon’s 
([1971]) statistical relevance approach an explanation is good if it cites all and only 
statistically relevant factors (factors that change the probability of the occurrence of an event) 
and it is irrelevant for the explanation whether these factors render the occurrence of the 
event-to-be-explained likely or not. According to Peter Railton’s ([1978]) ‘Deductive-
Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation’ the occurrence of an event can be explained 
even if it was rather unlikely to occur if we can deduce it from a probabilistic law. Both 
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approaches accept that in order to explain an event, it need not be deducible from 
deterministic laws of nature. Furthermore, both philosophers can be considered early new 
mechanists due to their commitment to the view that explanation consists in ‘revealing the 
mechanisms at work in the world’ (Salmon [1989], p. 156). In order to account for this 
doctrine, Salmon develops a process theory of causation that is supposed to provide the 
resources for satisfying the ontic constraints on successful (statistical) explanation (Salmon 
[1984]). Railton holds that revealing ‘the mechanisms at work in the world’ can be done by 
showing that the probabilistic law itself can be explained on the basis of the underlying 
mechanisms. Still, both approaches do not seem to be of much help for present purposes. The 
reason is that Salmon’s as well as Railton’s approach are accounts of token-level explanation 
and it is not clear how exactly they can be extended to cover type-level explanation. 
A more promising strategy is to look for a more liberal notion of regularity that still can 
account for the truth of type-level explanation. Andersen ([2012]), for example, admits that 
regularity cannot require a mechanism to always bring about the phenomenon at question 
(Andersen [2012], p. 419). Rather, she accepts that a mechanism can be regular even if it fails 
to bring about the phenomenon more often than it succeeds. According to Anderson, high-
failure mechanisms are regular if either, in cases of failure, one can identify interfering 
factors, or if there is a consistent percentage of times where the mechanism succeeds (which 
might be rather low) (Andersen [2012], p. 421). 
Although Andersen provides a compelling overview of the ways in which mechanisms 
might be regular, her account is problematic. First, not all high-failure mechanisms are regular 
in either of the two senses she defined. Second, she does not provide an explicit account of 
how the notion of regularity can be implemented into an account of mechanistic type-level 
explanation. Questions that remain unanswered are: How can we justify that a mechanism M 
explains a phenomenon P even if M does not bring about P in most cases? Can high failure 
mechanisms be truth-makers of mechanistic explanations at all? If high-failure mechanisms 
can be truth-makers of explanations, what distinguishes these explanations from false 
explanations? Do explanations have to refer to deterministic mechanisms (mechanisms that 
always bring about the relevant phenomenon) in order to be true? In this paper, I will develop 
an account of mechanistic type-level explanations that provides answers to these questions. I 
will show under which conditions high-failure mechanisms can be truthmakers of mechanistic 
type-level explanations. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I will explain how mechanisms are commonly 
characterized in the new mechanistic literature and how that connects to the issue of scientific 
type-level explanation. Furthermore, I will present the general idea that some kind of 
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regularity is necessary for mechanisms being potential truthmakers of type-level scientific 
explanation. In Section 3, I will spell out the regularity-based characterization of mechanisms 
in more detail. I will argue that formulations of regularity-based characterizations that have 
been developed so far are problematic because they cannot account for mechanisms being 
truthmakers of type-level explanations. In Section 4, the notion of Reverse Regularity is 
introduced. I will show how Reverse Regularity can cope with some of the problems classical 
regularity based views have. But I will argue that this suggestion is not sufficient to account 
for all cases of mechanistic type-level explanation. In Section 5, I will show that we need 
comparative notions of regularity in order to provide a satisfying account of mechanistic type-
level explanation. In Section 6, I will discuss multiple realization and multiple functionality as 
challenges for my approach and argue that meeting these challenges crucially depends on a 
satisfying account of how to individuate mechanism and phenomenon types. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2.  The Minimal Characterization of Mechanisms and Mechanistic Explanation 
There is an ambiguity in how the term ‘mechanism’ is used in the new mechanistic literature 
(Nicholson [2012]). Sometimes the term is used to refer to machine-like structures (for 
example Glennan [1996]); at other times, it is meant to refer to causal sequences. Here, I am 
concerned with the second use since it is more central to the new mechanistic thinking. At 
least what has come to be known as the ‘Minimal Characterization’ (MC) of mechanisms 
(Glennan [under review]) — which has become generally accepted amongst the new 
mechanists — describes a causal sequence rather than a machine-like structure2: 
 
(MC) Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they bring about a 
certain phenomenon. 
 
Entities are taken to be objects like neurons, cells, ions, rats and the like (Craver [2007a], pp. 
128–33). Activities are taken to be the things the entities do that allow them to causally 
interact with each other (Craver [2007a], pp. 133–4). Examples are opening, closing, 
diffusing, binding and the like. Entities and activities must be organized in a certain way in 
order to bring about the phenomenon (Craver [2007a], pp. 134–9). Entities are spatially 
organized: for example, they have specific locations relative to each other and they have 
specific sizes. Activities are temporally organized: they occur in a specific temporal order; 
                                                
2 For characterizations of mechanisms in accordance with (MC), see (Bechtel and Richardson [1993]; MDC 
[2000]; Bechtel and Abrahamsen [2005]; Craver [2007a]; Illari and Williamson [2012]). 
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they have certain durations, frequencies, and the like. Furthermore, entities and activities are 
what Craver calls ‘actively organized’ which means that they causally interact in specific 
ways (Craver [2007a], p. 136). Besides that, it is usually assumed that mechanisms can bring 
about phenomena in two different ways (note that in both cases, the mechanism is a causal 
sequence as characterized by (MC)). In etiological mechanistic explanations one refers to 
mechanisms that cause the phenomenon (for example, the explanation of neurotransmitter 
release). Constitutive mechanistic explanations refer to mechanisms that underlie or constitute 
the phenomenon (a common example is the action potential mechanism) (Craver [2007a], 
chapter 4.8; Kaiser and Krickel [2016]). (MC) characterizes mechanisms as causal sequences 
rather than machine-like structures because it requires mechanisms to involve various entities 
that actually interact. A machine is just one object, not many, and it need not be active in 
order to be a machine. In the following, when I speak of mechanisms as causal sequences I 
refer to mechanisms as characterized by (MC). 
To illustrate (MC), consider the mechanism for neurotransmitter release that was already 
mentioned in the introduction (Figure 1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
(MC) nicely captures many features of this example: the neurotransmitter release mechanism 
consists of various entities, such as the axon terminal, ion channels, calcium, proteins, 
synaptic vesicles, neurotransmitters and so on; it involves activities such as reaching, opening, 
changing, interacting, fusing; and these entities and activities are organized in various ways. 
For example, the ion channels have to be at certain locations at the axon terminal membrane; 
the channels have to open and close in a certain temporal order; and there have to be the right 
interactions in order for the ion channels to open and for the ions to influx into the axon 
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terminal. Furthermore, the neurotransmitter release mechanism brings about neurotransmitter 
release by causing it. 
How does (MC) relate to scientific explanation? As argued in the introduction, 
mechanisms are supposed to be the truthmakers of scientific explanations. Hence, one might 
think of (MC) as describing what the truthmaker of a mechanistic explanation look like. What 
exactly this claim amounts to has to be evaluated in the light of the general mechanistic 
ontology. The mechanistic ontology seems to be a singularist one. This is suggested by the 
general acceptance of so-called ‘entity-activity dualism’ (MDC [2000]; Machamer [2004]; 
Illari and Williamson [2011]). It is argued that the mechanistic ontology contains (only?) 
entities (objects) and activities (processes). Both are concrete things that occupy definite 
space-time regions. Furthermore, Sheredos ([2015]) convincingly argues that the new 
mechanists cannot accept the existence of Platonic universals due to their naturalism and they 
cannot accept Aristotelian universals (at least not as truth-makers of type-level 
generalizations) since the individuation of these universals would presuppose the very 
generalization they are supposed to make true.3 Plausibly, in the mechanistic ontology, types 
can only exist in so far as tokens exist that can be subsumed under a type description (due to, 
for example, relevant similarities they share; see Section 6). Hence, mechanistic type-level 
explanations could be understood as general descriptions, while mechanisms themselves are 
concrete tokens located in space and time.4 For example, Stuart Glennan ([2011]) argues: 
 
[o]ntologically, the crucial point to observe is that mechanisms are not universals but particulars. 
They are structured collections of parts which occupy a certain region of space and which interact 
over a certain definite period of time. We characterize these mechanisms by generalizations 
because very often a mechanism’s behavior is repeatable. (Glennan [2011], p. 810) 
 
                                                
3 Sheredos ([2015]) discusses different suggestion of how types might be integrated into the mechanistic 
ontology. He argues that the most plausible approach to universals that is compatible with the new mechanistic 
view is Aristotelian Realism, according to which universals can exist in multiple places and times by being co-
located in each of its instances. Based on his discussion of the ontology of types, Sheredos develops an argument 
against the ontic view of explanation: the acceptance of Aristotelian types is the consequence of a prior 
acceptance of epistemic norms of generality that cannot be inferred from the ontic view. As already noted, I am 
not committed to the ontic view of explanation here. Rather, I do accept that type-level explanations are 
descriptions that might have been developed on the basis of several epistemic norms. I am only committed to the 
view that the truth of an explanation depends on the mapping between the descriptions and certain features of the 
tokens that fall into the scope of the description. Furthermore, I am not committed to Aristotelian realism with 
regard to types either. My arguments seem to be compatible with nominalism as well.  
4 In this paper, I do not address the question of whether mechanisms themselves are types or concrete particulars. 
Maybe a token causal chain of organized entities and activities is a mechanism only if it falls under a general 
mechanistic description (defenders of the regularity-based characterization of mechanisms seem to think that; see 
introduction and below). Maybe causal chains can be mechanisms even if they do not fall under a general 
mechanistic description (Glennan argues for this claim; see Glennan [2010]). I do not want to settle this issue 
here. 
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The commitment to ontic constraints on mechanistic explanation plus the endorsement of a 
singularist ontology has important consequences for type-level explanations: type-level 
claims about mechanisms, phenomena and their relation have to have singularist truthmakers. 
The claim that the neurotransmitter release mechanism explains neurotransmitter release, for 
example, is somehow made true by features of the token instances of the mechanism and the 
phenomenon and the causal relations in which they stand.  
In this paper, I will assume that mechanism types explain because their instances cause or 
constitute (instances of) phenomena. In other words, I will presuppose a singularist 
interpretation of causation and constitution (according to which the relata of causation and 
constitution are primarily tokens). This assumption seems to be justified given the singularist 
ontological commitments of the new mechanists.5 Of course, a singularist ontology is 
compatible with a generalist view (the view that the relata of causation and constitution are 
primarily types) as well if the truthmakers of the generalist causal/constitutive claims are 
taken to be singularist. I opt for a singularist view of causation and constitution because it 
allows me to ignore the question of what causation and constitution exactly are for a moment. 
I will assume that we have a more or less good understanding of what it means to say that a 
mechanism token causes/constitutes a phenomenon token (see Kaiser and Krickel [2016]) for 
an analysis of constitution between tokens) and concentrate on how we make sense of type-
level explanation given knowledge about token-level causation/constitution. But my 
considerations will not depend on the acceptance of singularist view of causation and/or 
constitution.6  
Based on these assumptions, a first attempt to spell out an account of type-level 
explanation might be the following: a mechanism type explains a phenomenon type if and 
only if every instance of the former causes or constitutes7 an instance of the latter (a similar 
                                                
5 Among the new mechanists, singularist as well as generalist views with regard to causation and constitution can 
be found: mechanists endorsing activity-causation are singularists (Machamer [2004]; Glennan [2011]); those 
that defend interventionist theories of causation or constitution are generalist (see Craver [2007b]; Baumgartner 
and Gebharter [2015]; Romero [2015]; for a generalist view of constitution not in terms of interventionism see 
Harbecke [2010] and Couch [2011]). 
6 Everything I am going to say can be reformulated in terms of generalist views of causation and constitution. 
Then, the basic claim made above ‘mechanism types explain because their instances cause/constitute 
phenomena’ has to be reformulated: ‘mechanism types explain because they cause or constitute phenomena’—
the question, then, would be how to spell out type-level causation/constitution such that the singularist truth-
makers of the generalist causal/constitutive claims are at the same time plausible truth-makers of type-level 
mechanistic explanation (given the problems I am going to address in what follows). 
7 Most of the debate on regularity in the context of the new mechanistic debate seems to be framed in terms of 
etiological mechanistic explanation (the neurotransmitter release mechanism is a common example when 
regularity is discussed which is a mechanism that causes its phenomenon). How the considerations concerning 
regularity apply to constitutive mechanistic explanation is a matter of debate. Some authors argue that 
mechanistic constitution is a necessitation relation (Harbecke [2010]; Couch [2011]). Others argue that 
mechanisms have to be distinguished from background factors, where the latter are necessary for the 
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idea regarding the relation between type- and token-level causal claims can be found in 
Hausman [2005], p. 38). Figure 2 illustrates this idea.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 
In Figure 2 the capital letters A and B stand for types and the small letters stand for the 
corresponding tokens/instances. Applied to the case of mechanisms, A stands for a 
mechanism type, whereas B stands for a phenomenon type. The mechanism type A explains 
phenomenon type B if and only if every instance of the mechanism A causes/constitutes an 
instance of phenomenon B. 
The idea that type-level mechanistic explanation depends on some kind of constant causal 
or constitutive conjunction between instances of the mechanism and instances of the 
phenomenon is reflected by what I have called the ‘regularity-based characterization’ of 
mechanisms. In the following section, I will spell out the regularity-based characterization of 
mechanisms in more detail.  
 
3. Regularity 
Defenders of regularity-based characterizations (MDC [2000]; Barros [2008]; Andersen 
[2012]) usually argue that a causal sequence, in order to deserve the label ‘mechanism’, has to 
be regular. In other words, these authors deny that one-off causal chains can be mechanisms. 
Stuart Glennan ([2010]), in contrast to that, argues that there can be historical mechanisms 
which he calls ‘ephemeral mechanisms’ that occur only once. I do not want to settle this issue 
here. Still, the question of how the notion of regularity should be understood in the context of 
the new mechanistic approach seems to arise for both camps. Everyone who accepts that there 
                                                                                                                                                   
phenomenon to occur but are not part of the mechanism (Craver [2007a], chapter 4.8). The latter view implies 
that the mechanism is not sufficient for the phenomenon, and thus might fail to constitute the phenomenon. 
Plausibly, if one accepts the Bogen-argument in the context of etiological mechanistic explanation, one has good 
reasons to accept it for constitutive mechanistic explanation as well. Hence, mechanistic constitution might be 
probabilistic in some sense as well. 
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can be true type-level mechanistic explanations has to tell a story of how mechanisms can be 
the truthmakers of these explanations; and the most plausible answer to that question seems to 
be that (at least some) mechanisms are regular in some sense.  
How do we have to understand regularity such that this notion can be used to make sense 
of mechanistic type-level explanation? In order to answer this question we should clarify 
under which conditions a possible answer to this question is good, and when it is not. In what 
follows, I will assume the two following criteria of adequacy: first, an approach to regularity 
as the basis for true mechanistic explanations has to account for clear cases of true 
mechanistic explanation. Second, it has to make intelligible how or why regularity grounds 
type-level mechanistic explanation. That means, it should clarify why a mechanism explains a 
phenomenon rather than another and it should provide a plausible story as to why, on the 
grounds of the respective notion of regularity, one explanation qualifies for being true while 
another does not. 
Furthermore, before developing an approach to regularity, we have to clarify what exactly 
the bearer of regularity is supposed to be. Plausibly, regularity is a feature of sequence types. 
In the context of an analysis of mechanistic type-level explanation, the sequence type that has 
to be regular consists of the mechanism type and the phenomenon type.8 (In case of 
etiological explanations we are dealing with ‘causal sequences’; in constitutive explanations 
we are dealing with ‘constitutive pairs’ where the mechanism and the phenomenon occur at 
the same time—for the sake of simplicity I will speak of ‘sequences’ in both cases). In what 
follows, I will often speak of a causal/constitutive sequence type that consists of two sequence 
types A and B. This is meant to be an abbreviation of the phrase that there is a (sequence) 
type A whose instances cause/constitute instances of another (sequence) type B (or, if one 
endorses a generalist view of causation/constitution, one might say that A causes/constitutes 
B). 
Now, what does it mean to say that the sequence consisting of the mechanism and the 
phenomenon is regular? Andersen ([2012]) holds that regularity in this context is a factual 
notion rather than a counterfactual one. She argues that ‘[t]he notion of regularity […] is 
actual and not counterfactual, namely, multiple occurrences in the actual world’ (Andersen 
                                                
8 Andersen ([2012]) discusses different causal sequences as bearers of regularity that are crucial for the question 
of how regular a mechanism is. She argues that in order to determine the overall regularity of a mechanism, one 
has to determine how regularly the relevant inputs of a certain mechanism occur, how reliably the mechanism is 
triggered by a certain input, how stable the connections between the mechanism's components are, and how 
reliably the mechanism brings about the phenomenon. Here, we can ignore the former and focus on the latter 
sequence because, for present purposes, it is not relevant whether, for example, the mechanism occurs regularly 
given the input. If one is interested in mechanisms as, for example, supporting interventionist strategies, one 
might have to talk about the regularity of other causal sequences as well such as the input-mechanism sequence 
or the sequence consisting of the mechanism's components. 
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[2012], p. 430). The notion of regularity that Andersen seems to have in mind can be defined 
as follows: 
 
(Factual Regularity) A causal/constitutive sequence type is factually regular iff it has 
multiple9 actual instances. 
 
The claim that mechanisms are regular in this sense implies that the sequence consisting of 
the mechanism type and the phenomenon type has to have multiple instances. In other words, 
mechanisms correspond to types of sequences that have multiple instances in the actual world 
that successfully bring about (cause or constitute) instances of a particular phenomenon type.  
The assumption that mechanisms are factually regular in the sense just presented is 
plausible at least when restricting the analysis to biological mechanisms. First, clear cases of 
mechanisms in the life sciences that are central examples in the new mechanistic debate are 
indeed factually regular (like the neurotransmitter release mechanism, the action potential 
mechanism, the spatial memory mechanism). Second, biological mechanisms develop in the 
course of biological evolution. Natural selection, which is the motor of biological evolution, 
results in individuals of the same species being made up in the same way such that they (or 
their parts) are disposed to give rise to the same mechanisms. Third, as a matter of fact it is 
rather difficult to find valid examples of biological causal sequences that are not factually but 
merely counterfactually regular (for which it is true that they occurred only once and if certain 
circumstances had obtained again, a causal sequence of the same type would have occurred 
again). Fourth, even if biological mechanisms might be counterfactually regular, the idea is 
that this modal knowledge is not relevant for the causal and explanatory power of a particular 
mechanism (one reason for that is the notorious difficulty to spell out a semantics for 
counterfactuals; Bogen [2004], [2005]). 
So far, our characterization of regularity fits well to our considerations made in Section 2 
(see Figure 2): a mechanism type A explains a phenomenon type B if and only if sequence 
type consisting of A and B has multiple instances. Unfortunately, this requirement has a 
reading that is too strong with regard to the present purpose. It is too strong if we interpret 
Factual Regularity as a deterministic notion: 
 
                                                
9 What exactly does it mean to hold that a type has ‘multiple instances’? For present purposes, it suffices to 
assume that ‘multiple instances’ means to have more than one instance (the type is not a singular occurrence and 
it is not merely potentially regular). 
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(Deterministic Regularity)  A causal/constitutive sequence type consisting of A and B is 
deterministically regular iff all instances of A cause/constitute 
instances of B. 
 
Applying Deterministic Regularity to mechanistic type-level explanations amounts to the 
claim all instances of a mechanism (A) have to bring about an instance of the phenomenon 
(B) in order for the mechanism to explain the phenomenon. This requirement is problematic 
because it is commonly accepted that mechanisms can fail to bring about the phenomenon 
they are supposed to explain. The idea that mechanisms can fail makes sense only if we 
interpret it as a claim about types that have instances that do not bring about the phenomenon 
that is individuative of the mechanism type. For example, in order to make sense of the claim 
that the neurotransmitter release mechanism has a certain failure rate, we have to assume that 
there are causal sequences that belong to the mechanism type ‘neurotransmitter release 
mechanism’ although they do not produce neurotransmitter release and even though they 
might not involve all the causal steps that are characteristic of the neurotransmitter release 
mechanism. In order to be able to determine when a certain mechanism belongs to a certain 
type or not a more careful analysis of the identity criteria of mechanism types and tokens is 
required. I will make some remarks on that issue in Section 6. 
The idea that there are stochastic mechanisms––mechanism types that have instances that 
do not bring about the phenomenon––is commonly accepted among the new mechanists 
(Bogen [2005]; Barros [2008]; DesAutels [2011]; Andersen [2012]). Figure 3 illustrates the 
idea of stochastic mechanisms. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
 
In Figure 3, the stochastic nature of the relationship between a mechanism and a phenomenon 
is represented. The arrows pointing down indicate that the instances of A do not 
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cause/constitute an instance of B. By putting it this way, I am not claiming that the stochastic 
nature of mechanisms should be analyzed in terms of a frequentist account of probability. In 
this paper, I do not discuss which interpretation of probability is most adequate in the context 
of stochastic mechanisms (for arguments against a frequentist interpretation of stochastic 
mechanisms and in favor of propensities see DesAutels [2015]); for a mechanistic 
interpretation of probability see Abrams [2012]). 
How can stochastic mechanisms be the truthmakers of mechanistic type-level 
explanations? One straightforward answer might be to say that a mechanism type explains a 
phenomenon type if the majority of instances of the mechanism type brings about the 
phenomenon. This strategy relies on a modified notion of regularity: 
 
(Stochastic Regularity)  A causal/constitutive sequence type consisting of type A 
and type B is stochastically regular iff more than 50% of 
instances of A cause/constitute instances of B. 
 
One might argue that a value >50% is sufficient for a causal sequence to count as regular 
since it implies that there are more instances of a mechanism that do cause/constitute the 
phenomenon than instances that do not cause/constitute the phenomenon. Still, this suggestion 
is problematic for two reasons: first, it fails to account for the second criterion of adequacy. It 
does not provide an answer to the question of why, for example, a mechanism whose 
instances bring about the phenomenon only in 50% of the cases cannot be explanatory. Why 
should the corresponding explanation be false while an explanation referring to an only 
slightly more regular mechanism should be true? Drawing a demarcation line in this way 
seems to be rather arbitrary. Neither abandoning the demand for a value >50% and simply 
requiring a ‘high’ value does help since it is either unclear what ‘high’ is supposed to mean or 
it simply leaves undetermined a yet to be defined value. Second, the suggestion fails because 
it is commonly accepted that there are mechanisms that fail more often than they succeed 
(Bogen [2005], p. 400; see also Barros [2008]; DesAutels [2011]; Andersen [2012]). Figure 4 
illustrates the idea of a high-failure mechanism (there are more as that do not bring about 
instances of B than as that bring about instances of B). 
 




High failure mechanisms are regular in the factual sense—they have multiple instances. But 
they are not stochastically regular: more instances of the particular mechanism type fail to 
bring about the phenomenon than succeed in bringing about the phenomenon. The 
neurotransmitter release mechanism is taken to be such a high failure mechanism (Bogen 
[2005]; Andersen [2012]). Still, the neurotransmitter release mechanism is considered a true 
type-level explanation of neurotransmitter release. 
Another example of a high-failure mechanism is the cancer mechanism. Consider Figure 5 
as an illustration of the cancer mechanism.  
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
 
When a carcinogen enters healthy tissue this leads to damages of the DNA of the particular 
cell. The cell replicates which leads to the proliferation of daughter cells that inherit the 
damaged DNA. This leads to abnormal cell replication. The result is the occurrence of 
dysplasia and, in the end, cancer. This schematic illustration of the cancer mechanism depicts 
what is considered a valid type-level explanation of cancer. Still, this mechanism is highly 
irregular in that in most cases it does not lead to cancer. In their discussion of ‘why don't we 
get more cancer’ Mina Bissell and William Hines ([2011]) argue: 
[f]rom the moment of conception and throughout life, these cells [cells of the human body] are assailed 
with radiation, oxidative damage and more. Individuals’ own genetic susceptibility, damage from 
cigarette smoke and pollution, lack of exercise, obesity and, of course, aging itself can cause many 
oncogenes to get activated and many tumor suppressors to be inactivated. Yet these mutated cells that, 
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according to current dogmas, should lose control and become autonomous do not seem to form as many 
cancers as would be expected from the number of harmful mutations. In fact, the majority of people live 
cancer-free lives for decades. (Bissell and Hines [2011], p. 320) 
 
Why are scientists justified in saying that the cancer mechanism explains cancer even though, 
in most cases, it does not lead to cancer? Why can we say that the neurotransmitter release 
mechanism explains neurotransmitter release even though most instances of the mechanism 
do not bring about neurotransmitter release?  
One strategy might be to argue that high-failure mechanisms ground type-level 
explanations because they are incomplete descriptions of processes that are in fact 
deterministic (that means one sticks to Deterministic Regularity). In other words, high-failure 
mechanism (and stochastic mechanisms in general) do not really exist—if our knowledge 
about the world were complete, we could describe, for example, the neurotransmitter release 
mechanism in such a way that all of its instances turn out to be successful. This strategy is 
problematic. The first reason is what I call the ‘Bogen Argument’ (a similar argument can be 
found in Cartwright [1983], p. 49). Bogen presents this argument in his [2005] paper which 
started the discussion about how regular mechanisms have to be (Bogen seems to presuppose 
a generalist view of causation; therefore the argument has to be slightly modified to make it 
applicable to my considerations that presuppose a singularist view of causation; I added 
expressions in square brackets to indicate the necessary modifications). 
 
Regularists may insist that no matter how unreliable a mechanism seems to be it can't produce [explain] 
effects unless its operation instances natural regularities. Maybe we don't know how to describe them to a 
satisfactory approximation. Maybe we don't even know what they are. But all the same, there must be 
regularities in there somewhere, and the mechanism must operate in accordance with them. That's an 
article of faith. It doesn't have enough empirical support to rule out the possibility that some causes 
[mechanisms] operate indeterministicaly and irregularly. As long as there is a non-negligible chance that 
some causes [mechanisms] operate irregularly, philosophical accounts of causality [mechanistic 
explanation] should leave room for them. (Bogen [2005], p. 400) 
 
The assumption that all apparent cases of irregularity are due to lack of knowledge, according 
to this argument, is ‘an article of faith’. It rests on the assumption that we live in a 
deterministic world. But we do not know whether the world is like that. Our analysis of 
mechanisms and type-level mechanistic explanation should better be independent of this 
assumption.  
A second problem for this strategy is that scientists accept high-failure mechanisms as true 
explanations independently of whether they think that there is more to know that would 
render the relation deterministic (a similar argument can be found in Cartwright [1983], p. 
52). Scientists take the neurotransmitter release mechanism to explain neurotransmitter 
release even though they do not know what explains its failures. They seem to provide 
mechanistic explanations of phenomena independently of whether they think that there could 
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be a more detailed description of the mechanism that would render the relation between the 
mechanism and the phenomenon deterministic or not (although it might be an ideal that drives 
scientific research). 
Andersen ([2012]) accepts that most mechanisms are not deterministic and that some even 
might have high failure rates. According to her, mechanisms are regular enough in order to 
ground type-level explanation if one of two conditions is satisfied (note that Andersen does 
not explicitly address the question of how mechanistic type-level explanation works; rather 
she argues that mechanisms have to be regular in order to count as mechanisms in the first 
place; Andersen [2012], p. 421). Let us call the first condition ‘Frequented Regularity’ and 
the second ‘Interrupted Regularity’. 
 
(Frequented regularity)  A causal/constitutive sequence type consisting of type A and type 
B is frequented regular iff there is a consistent percentage of 
times where instances of A cause/constitute instances of B. 
 
(Interrupted regularity)  A causal/constitutive sequence type consisting of type A and type 
B is interruptedly regular iff every time when an instance of A 
does not cause/constitute and instance of B interfering factors can 
be identified. 
 
I agree that Interrupted Regularity provides a notion of regularity that grounds type-level 
explanation. It states that there is a mechanism that always brings about a phenomenon ceteris 
paribus (except for cases in which certain interfering factors occur). The cp-clause does not 
trivialize the assumption of a deterministic generalization because Andersen also requires that 
we know which factors were responsible for the failure of the mechanism. Still, applying 
Interrupted Regularity to mechanistic type-level explanation is problematic. First, as a matter 
of fact, in most cases scientists do not know which factors were interfering with the working 
of a mechanism. And this does not hinder scientists from accepting the mechanism at issue as 
a true explanation. Scientists accept the neurotransmitter release mechanism (Figure 1) or the 
cancer mechanism (Figure 5) as true type-level mechanistic explanations although they do not 
know exactly which factors lead to failures of these mechanisms. The explanatory status of 
these mechanisms seems to be independent of whether scientists know the failing conditions 
or not. Second, the Bogen Argument applies here as well. Interrupted Regularity relies on the 
idea that the world in principal behaves deterministically. Every time a mechanism fails there 
is some going-on in the world that is responsible for it. But some mechanisms might be 
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inherently stochastic. We should allow for stochastic mechanisms grounding type-level 
explanations independently of whether there might be a factor that explains why these 
mechanisms fail if they fail.  
Frequented regularity does not require that the world behave in principle deterministically 
in order for a sequence to be regular. Rather, applied to mechanisms, it merely requires that 
stochastic mechanisms succeed with a constant frequency. Even if the majority of instances of 
a particular mechanism type do not bring about the phenomenon, the mechanism counts as 
regular if, say, every tenth instance does not fail. Andersen ([2012]) argues that high failure 
mechanisms, such as the neurotransmitter release mechanism, can be said to be regular if 
regularity is understood in terms of Frequented Regularity. Still, this notion of regularity is 
problematic. First, the success probabilities of high failure mechanisms need not be 
consistent. Investigating the neurotransmitter release mechanism, Tiago Branco and Kevin 
Staras ([2009]) argue that 
 
evidence has accumulated which shows that single terminals contributing to a connection can have 
release probabilities that are diverse and that can change over time. (Branco and Staras [2009], p. 373) 
 
Second, Frequented Regularity is a non-starter if one does not introduce a minimal value for 
how often the mechanism has to succeed in order to count as regular. Otherwise, causal 
chains that have a consistent success rate of 0% will come out as regular. Integrating 
Frequented Regularity into an account of type-level explanation, then, would have the odd 
consequence that a phenomenon is explained by everything that never causes/constitutes it. 
Hence, we have to determine a minimal value >0. Unfortunately, the problem mentioned 
above now reoccurs: postulating a minimal value seems to be rather arbitrary and leaves open 
as to why this value is crucial for grounding type-level explanation. 
Third, even if a high failure mechanism shows a constant but low success rate, one might 
still wonder how such a mechanism can ground type-level explanations. Again, this 
suggestion seems to fail to account for the second criterion of adequacy. If a mechanism 
brings about a phenomenon in, say, 5% of cases where it occurs—how can we justify that this 
mechanism explains this particular phenomenon rather than whatever else it produces in the 
remaining 95% of cases? Furthermore, if we assume that explanations referring to high-
failure mechanisms can indeed be true explanations, how can we distinguish true explanations 
from false ones?  
A problem similar to the one just raised already brought the traditional D-N-model into 
trouble. Deductivists were committed to the claim that one can explain a phenomenon only if 
one can deduce it from a set of laws and initial conditions. In order to cope with stochastic 
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events, Hempel ([1965]) developed his inductive statistical account of explanation, according 
to which stochastic events can be explained only if the explanans confers high probability to 
the event’s occurrence. Hence, deductivists seem to be committed to the claim that one cannot 
explain stochastic events whose occurrence is rather unlikely.  
In the following section, I will discuss a strategy of how to cope with unlikely events 
(types) that rejects the idea that there can be only explanations of probable events. This 
strategy is based on a different kind of regularity, which I will call ‘Reverse Regularity’.  
 
4. Reverse Regularity 
One example of Reverse Regularity, in the sense that I want to put forward in what follows, is 
the one discussed by Scriven ([1959]) and Salmon ([1998]): sometimes having syphilis leads 
to paresis. But the relation between paresis and syphilis is not deterministic since most people 
who have syphilis do not have paresis. Still, we want to say that having syphilis causally 
explains a person’s having paresis. According to the present suggestion, the syphilis explains 
paresis because their relation is reversely regular: all people suffering from paresis also have 
syphilis.10 Dealing with token-level explanation, Salmon gave a similar answer arguing that 
an explanation need not state necessary conditions in order to be explanatory:11  
 
untreated latent syphilis sometimes causes paresis and sometimes does not; but in all cases in 
which paresis occurs, it is caused by latent untreated syphilis, and latent untreated syphilis explains 
the paresis. (Salmon [1998], pp. 147–8.) 
 
The core idea of the present suggestion is that a mechanism grounds the explanation of a 
particular phenomenon type if the mechanism-phenomenon sequence instantiates what I call 
‘Reverse Regularity’. A preliminary definition of Reverse Regularity is the following:  
 
(Reverse Regularity)  A causal/constitutive sequence type consisting of type A and 
type B is reversely regular iff all instances of B are 
caused/constituted by instances of A. 
 
                                                
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for mentioning this similarity and for suggesting this example. 
11 According to Salmon’s ‘Statistical Relevance Model’ ([1998]), to explain an event is to describe all and only 
those factors that are statistically relevant to the occurrence of the event. Unfortunately, it is not clear how to 
apply this account to type-level explanation. The reason is that it is not clear how to determine the reference 
class that is relevant to the explanation of an event type. Furthermore, as Salmon himself admits, explanation in 
terms of statistical relevance alone is not sufficient – one has to identify the causal mechanisms as well. The 
latter is exactly what the new mechanistic approach aims at. The development of an account of the latter with 
regard to type-level explanation is the aim of this paper. 
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(Note that as in the case of regularity that was discussed in the previous section, it is plausible 
to assume that Reverse Regularity is a factual notion). When applied to explanation, this 
notion of regularity delivers the following account: A explains B if every instance of B is 
brought about by an instance of A. This does not require that all instances of A bring about an 
instance of B in order for A to explain B. Figure 6 illustrates this idea. 
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
 
With Reverse Regularity at hand, we can account for high failure mechanisms as grounding 
true explanations of phenomenon types. Even though a high failure mechanism does not bring 
about the phenomenon in most of the cases of its occurrence, it can still ground type-level 
explanation if all instances of the phenomenon are caused by that mechanism. Consider the 
neurotransmitter release mechanism. Neurotransmitter release is explained by the 
neurotransmitter release mechanism because all instances of neurotransmitter release are due 
to the neurotransmitter release mechanism (one indicator that this is the case is the fact that 
biology textbooks only mention the mechanism for neurotransmitter release depicted above as 
a mechanism for neurotransmitter release). Similarly, the cancer mechanism depicted in 
Figure 5 is a true type-level explanation of cancer because in cases where cancer occurs, the 
mechanism has occurred before—there is no cancer without abnormal cell replication, and 
there is no abnormal cell replication without DNA damage. 
The notion of Reverse Regularity is not only helpful for an analysis of type-level 
mechanistic explanation. In general, the notion of Reverse Regularity accounts for the fact 
that scientists often retrodict causes based on their knowledge about mechanisms. For 
example, physicians infer the causes of symptoms they observe in their patients on the basis 
of their knowledge about Reverse Regularity relationships between the symptoms and 
mechanisms that might be responsible for them. In doing so they can evaluate which 
treatment is most likely to have positive effects. Similarly, knowledge about mechanisms that 
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instantiate Reverse Regularity can be used to ground inferences to the best explanation.12 
Given that we observe a certain phenomenon and we know about different Reverse Regularity 
relations that phenomenon is known to stand in we are justified in retrodicting that the 
phenomenon was caused by the event with the highest Reverse Regularity value. 
Furthermore, knowledge about Reverse Regularity relationships plays a role in mechanism 
discovery. If scientists are searching for the mechanism of a particular phenomenon, they use 
their knowledge about Reverse Regularity relationships between the phenomenon and 
different possible causes the phenomenon has in other contexts where it occurs. 
Unfortunately, there is an obvious objection against Reverse Regularity that is analogous 
to the objection against Deterministic Regularity as discussed in the previous section: most 
biological phenomena can be brought about in various different ways. Figure 7 illustrates this 
problem. 
 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
 
 
A phenomenon might be brought about by various different causes/constituents and, hence, 
these phenomena cannot establish Reverse Regularity (in the sense defined above) with 
regard to any of their causes/constituents. For example, neurotransmitter release might be due 
to a scientist’s manipulation, lighting strikes, or other accidental causes. Can we fix Reverse 
Regularity such that it accounts for these cases as well? Obviously, we might try strategies 
analogous to those that were discussed in the previous section in order to account for 
stochastic mechanisms. We could reformulate Reverse Regularity such that it requires only 
that most instances of the phenomenon are brought about by the mechanism. But this strategy 
must fail if there is a reverse analogue to high failure mechanisms—if there are phenomena 
that can be due to a multitude of different causes/constituents. This latter case might be 
                                                
12 Thanks to Marshall Abrams for bringing up this idea. 
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realized in two different ways. First, there might be phenomena that can be due to various 
different mechanism types. Many diseases and disease-symptoms can be due to many 
different mechanisms. For example, there are various different mechanisms leading to 
dizziness. These mechanisms include inadequate blood supply to the brain due to a sudden 
fall in blood pressure, heart problems or artery blockages, loss or distortion of vision or visual 
cues, disorders of the inner ear, distortion of brain function by medications such as 
anticonvulsants and sedatives (Tucci [2013]), or it might be a side effect of certain medical 
drugs or of consuming too much alcohol. Another example is body temperature homeostasis 
that is achieved by different mechanisms such as sweating, shivering, and the raising of skin 
hair. An example taken from cell biology are the different mechanisms that are responsible 
for the formation of new lumens (i.e. tubular structures) (Sigurbjörnsdóttir et al. [2014]). In 
none of these cases it is true that most instances of the phenomenon are brought about by one 
particular mechanism (in Section 6, I will argue that these examples are cases of multiple 
realization.) 
Second, there might be a multitude of different types of singular causes/constituents or 
one-off causal chains (or ‘ephemeral mechanisms’, see Glennan [2010]) leading to a given 
phenomenon where these singular causes together might even be more likely to bring about 
the phenomenon than the mechanism. Admittedly, it is not easy to find a real biological 
example for such a scenario. This might be due to the fact that biologists are usually not 
interested in singular causes of a phenomenon (if there is a mechanism for that particular 
phenomenon), and therefore do not talk about them in their research papers; or it might be due 
to the fact that there is no such example. In this paper, I will accept this scenario as possible—
it might be the case that a particular phenomenon is more often brought by an instance of a 
singular cause/one-off causal chain than by a mechanism.  
Again, we might reformulate Reverse Regularity in order to account for these cases. We 
might accept that there are cases where a phenomenon is only rarely brought about by one 
particular mechanism and still count as regular. We could just determine a rather low minimal 
value for how many instances of a phenomenon P have to be brought about by instances of a 
particular mechanism M in order for M to explain P. But, again, the strategy fails for reasons 
already addressed in the previous section: first, any stipulation of a minimal value must be 
arbitrary. Second, this strategy leaves open as to why the corresponding notion of Reverse 
Regularity grounds the truth of type-level explanations. 
In the following section, I will make a suggestion of how to solve these problems that 
relies on a modification of the notions of Reverse Regularity and regularity. 
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5. Comparative Regularity and Reverse Regularity 
So far, all suggestions for how to spell out regularity in the context of mechanistic type-level 
explanations failed for one or more of the following four reasons:  
 
1) The suggestion relied on an arbitrarily chosen minimal value that determines which 
sequences count as regular and which do not. 
2) The suggestion could not make sense of why a particular notion of regularity grounds 
the truth of a type-level explanation. 
3) The suggestion presupposed that every mechanism-phenomenon relationship is in fact 
deterministic. 
4) There were counterexamples of (possibly) existing mechanism-phenomenon 
relationships that did not show the suggested kind of regularity. Most importantly, 
there are mechanism types whose instances usually do not bring about the phenomenon 
that the mechanism is supposed to explain, and there are phenomenon types whose 
instances are usually not brought about by instances of the mechanism that is supposed 
to explain the phenomenon. 
 
In this section, I will introduce a new suggestion for how to understand regularity that avoids 
these problems. Roughly, the idea is the following: a mechanism type M explains a 
phenomenon type P if and only if there is no other phenomenon type P* that is 
caused/constituted by more instances of M than P; or if there is no other mechanism type M* 
whose instances cause/constitute P more often than M. In the former case, the mechanism-
phenomenon sequence is what I will call ‘comparatively regular’. In the latter case the 
sequence is ‘comparatively reversely regular’. These two notions of regularity can be defined 
as follows: 
 
(Comparative Regularity)  A causal/constitutive sequence type consisting of type A and 
type B is comparatively regular iff there are more instances of A 
that cause/constitute an instance of B than instances of A that 
cause/constitute an instance of another type B*. 
 
(Comparative Reverse Regularity) A causal/constitutive sequence type consisting of type 
A and type B is comparatively reversely regular iff there are 
more instances of B that are caused/constituted by an instance of 
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A than instances of B that are brought about by an instance of 
another sequence type A*. 
 
More specifically, my account of mechanistic type-level explanation is the following: 
 
(Mechanistic Type-level Explanation) A mechanism type A explains a phenomenon 
type B iff the sequence type consisting of A and B is comparatively regular or 
comparatively reversely regular. 
 
This idea is depicted in Figures 8 and 9. 
 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
 
 




Take the neurotransmitter release mechanism again. This mechanism explains 
neurotransmitter release if and only if the effects it has in failure cases are not of the same 
type or if the alternative causes of neurotransmitter release do not constitute another 
mechanism type. Both conditions seem to be satisfied. Similarly, the cancer mechanism is 
comparatively reversely regular due to the fact that there are no alternative causes of cancer 
that form a unique mechanism type. But, interestingly, the mechanism-phenomenon 
relationship is not comparatively regular. The reason is that the alternative effects of the 
cancer mechanism (in failure cases) do form a unique phenomenon type. Bissell and Hines 
refer to the phenomenon type that occurs in failure cases as ‘occult cancer’ (Bissell and Hines 
[2011], p. 320). 
The advantage of the present approach is that it solves the problems afflicting the previous 
suggestions (see beginning of this section). First, Comparative Regularity/Comparative 
Reverse Regularity does not require that we need a ‘high degree’ of regularity or Reverse 
Regularity in order to ground type-level explanations. The comparative notions of regularity 
and Reverse Regularity do not rely on an arbitrary determination of how many exceptions a 
particular mechanism-phenomenon sequence is allowed to have. Rather, how comparatively 
regular or reversely regular a specific mechanism-phenomenon sequence is depends on how 
regular or reversely regular it is compared to alternative mechanism-phenomenon sequences 
are—which is in principle an objective and definite issue. Second, the present account 
provides the resources to explain why mechanism-phenomenon relationships that instantiate 
Comparative Regularity and/or Comparative Reverse Regularity provide true type-level 
explanations. Roughly, if a mechanism-phenomenon relationship is comparatively regular, the 
mechanism grounds the explanation of the phenomenon because there is nothing else that the 
mechanism might explain better. If a mechanism-phenomenon relationship is comparatively 
reversely regular, the mechanism constitutes a true explanation of the phenomenon because 
there is nothing else that explains the phenomenon better. This provides a good way of 
describing how scientists might think about type-level explanations: they accept a type-level 
explanation as true if it can be excluded that there is a better explanation/another mechanism 
or causal sequence type that provides a better explanation (is more regular or reversely 
regular) than the mechanism at issue. Third, invoking the notions of Comparative Regularity 
and Comparative Reverse Regularity also avoids problem 3) since these notions allow for 
mechanism-phenomenon relationships to be non-deterministic. Fourth, based on these 
notions, we can accept that a mechanism-phenomenon relationship is regular even if the 
mechanism usually does not bring about the phenomenon, or the phenomenon is usually not 
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brought about by the mechanism. I conclude that the comparative notions of regularity and 
Reverse Regularity provide a promising account of mechanistic type-level explanation. 
 
6. Multiple Realization, Multifunctionality and the Individuation of Types 
There is an obvious objection to the idea that the comparative notions of regularity and 
Reverse Regularity suffice for grounding type-level mechanistic explanations. My definition 
of mechanistic type-level explanation requires that there are no alternative phenomena that are 
more or equally likely to occur than the original phenomenon given the mechanism, or that 
there are no alternative mechanisms that are more or equally likely to occur than the original 
mechanism given the phenomenon. But surely there might be phenomena that can be due to 
more than one mechanism (see Section 4). Even more, my approach to mechanistic type-level 
explanation seems to exclude the possibility of multiple realization by definition (the 
possibility that there could be phenomena that can be due to more than one mechanism). 
Plausibly, cases of multiple realization might exist, and in these cases a phenomenon has 
more than one true mechanistic explanation. 
 
 (Multiple Realization)  A phenomenon B might be multiply realized by two distinct 
mechanism types A and J. In this case, A and J both explain B.  
 
We need independent criteria to be able to distinguish between cases of multiple realization 
and cases where a mechanism-phenomenon relation is simply not reversely regular. Plausibly, 
cases of multiple realization occur when a phenomenon exists in different contexts. In each 
context a different mechanism is responsible for the same phenomenon. An example of 
multiple realization might be the vision mechanism. Some instances of the vision mechanism 
involve ommatidia, some do not. Still, mechanisms involving ommatidia explain vision 
because they constitute one of various different types of vision mechanisms. The difference 
between these types is that they are instantiated in different animals, like those involving 
ommatidia are instantiated in insects (and, hence, they occur in different contexts). 
The counterpart to multiple realization is what I will call ‘multifunctionality’. 
Multifunctionality concerns the possibility of a mechanism bringing about more than one 
phenomenon. 
 
(Multifunctionality)  A mechanism A might bring about two distinct phenomena B and F. 
In this case, A explains B as well as F. 
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Also, multifunctionality should not be excluded by definition, given that it constitutes a 
scenario that is accepted in the sciences. One example of multifunctionality might be the 
mechanism that is responsible for DNA-replication as well as re-replication: 
 
the replication and re-replication mechanisms are the same, even though replication is said to be a normal 
process and re-replication an abnormal one [...] In both processes pre-RCs must be assembled, licensed 
and then fired and in all of these events the same proteins take part. For an abnormal process (re-
replication) to occur an abnormal surrounding is necessary which is a result of impaired replication 
regulation [...].  (Mazurczyk and Rybaczek [2015], p. 31) 
 
As before, we need independent criteria to be able to identify cases of multifunctionality. 
Plausibly, one should find differences in the contexts in which mechanism A brings about B 
and contexts where A brings about F. This idea is supported by the example where ‘an 
abnormal surrounding is necessary’ for re-replication to occur. 
Surely, whether we are dealing with a case of multiple realization or multiple functionality 
or not crucially depends on how we individuate mechanism and phenomenon types. Two 
questions have to be answered:  
 
1) When do two mechanism/phenomenon tokens belong to the same 
mechanism/phenomenon type?  
2) How fine- or coarse-grained should we describe mechanism/phenomenon types?  
 
The first question aims at determining which features of, for example, a mechanism are 
essential for its individuation. Consider two mechanisms that differ only in that one involves 
an entity and an activity the other does not involve. Are these two mechanisms of the same 
type? One answer might be that the two mechanisms are of the same type, if and only if they 
bring about the same phenomenon. The problem with this suggestion is that it does not allow 
for multiple realization. Intuitively, the identity of a mechanism type does not only depend on 
the phenomenon it produces but also on the entities and activities and their organization that 
make up the mechanism. Multiple realization, rather, should be taken to obtain if there are 
two or more mechanisms that ‘do the same but in different ways’ (Shapiro [2000]). Then, the 
question is, when mechanisms should be taken to do the same in different ways. Is the fact 
that one mechanism is composed of an acting entity that the other mechanism is not 
composed of sufficient to grant that the former works in a different way? 
The second question asks for how to pick out types. Depending on which description is 
used, different things in the world are singled out. When referring to entities, one could, for 
example, use a description that picks out entities based on their functional features, another 
description picks out objects based on their structural features. Some descriptions are more 
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abstract and rather general others describe many details. Type-level descriptions of 
mechanisms that abstract from various details are what MDC ([2000]) and Craver ([2006]) 
call ‘mechanism schema’. 
 
Scientists [...] are typically interested in types of mechanisms, not all the details needed to describe a 
specific instance of a mechanism. We introduce the term ‘mechanism schema’ for an abstract description 
of a type of mechanism. A mechanism schema is a truncated abstract description of a mechanism that can 
be filled with descriptions of known component parts and activities […] Often, scientists use schema 
terms, such as ‘transcription’ and ‘translation,’ to capture compactly many aspects of the underlying 
mechanism. (MDC [2000], p. 16) 
 
For example, describing a mechanism or a step in a mechanism as ‘transcription’ ignores the 
specific details of what exactly is going on in transcription. The corresponding type-level 
description is rather coarse-grained, and thus various concrete causal sequences might fall 
under this type. A more fine-grained type-level description of transcription might not include 
as many instances as the coarse-grained description. 
A satisfying analysis of how to individuate mechanism and phenomenon types in the 
context of mechanistic explanation cannot be provided here. Surely, it is a crucial question not 
only with regard to the purposes of this paper but to the general account of mechanistic 
explanation. An account of mechanism and phenomenon types has to account for how 
scientists proceed in practice. Here, it might be fruitful to look at the methods of how 
scientists operationalize the phenomena they want to explain (operationalization might be 
seen as a process that starts with a rather general type description that is specified such that in 
the end individuals can be identified that can be investigated) (Feest [2005], [2010]; Sullivan 
[2009]). Plausibly, the identification of types in these contexts depends to a high degree on 
pragmatic considerations. In his discussion of the question whether mechanisms can ground 
natural kinds, Craver ([2009], p. 591) concludes that ‘human perspectives and conventions 
enter into judgments about how mechanisms should be types and individuated’. Hence, it is 
not an objective matter of how mechanism tokens are subsumed under type descriptions. How 
you individuate mechanisms and phenomena depends on what you want to explain, what you 
know, what interests you, what is actually possible to investigate given your methods, tools 
and so on. One consequence of this would be that there is more than one way of dividing 
mechanisms and phenomena into types. This again has an interesting consequence with 
regard to type-level mechanistic explanation: whether a certain mechanism-phenomenon 
relation is comparatively regular and comparatively reversely regular, and thus, whether a 
particular mechanism explains a certain phenomenon depends to a big part on how you 
individuate the types, and therefore on pragmatic considerations. 
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7.  Conclusion 
In order for a mechanistic explanation to be true it has to describe existing mechanisms. How 
can this idea be applied to type-level mechanistic explanation? What renders a mechanistic 
type-level explanation a true explanation? According to the account I developed in this paper, 
a mechanism type explains a particular phenomenon type if and only if the mechanism-
phenomenon sequence is comparatively regular or comparatively reversely regular. This 
account allows for stochastic mechanisms and even mechanisms that are rather unlikely to 
produce their phenomena to be truthmakers of type-level mechanistic explanation. 
Furthermore, based on this account, we can explain why regularity and Reverse Regularity 
ground mechanistic type-level explanation. 
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Appendix: Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Diagram of the neurotransmitter release mechanism (my illustration). 
Figure 2: A explains B iff every instance of A causes or constitutes an instance of B. 
Figure 3: Stochastic mechanisms - not every instance of A causes/constitutes an instance of B. 
Figure 4: High-failure mechanisms: most instances of A do not cause/constitute instances of 
B. 
Figure 5: Diagram of the cancer mechanism (my illustration based on Navarro (2011)).  
Figure 6: Reverse Regularity: A explains B if every instance of B is caused/constituted by an 
instance of A. (The doted arrows indicate that the b’s are caused or constituted by the a’s) 
Figure 7: Some instances of B might not be caused or constituted by an instance of A. The 
dotted lines indicate the ‘being caused/constituted by’ relation. 
Figure 8: Comparative regularity: A explains B if more as bring about bs than as bring about 
any other type (indicated by different letters c, d, e, f, g).  
Figure 9: Comparative Reverse Regularity: A explains B if more bs are brought about by as 
than bs brought about by any other type (indicated by different letters j, k, l, m, n). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
